- Many Somalis crave unity. In 1960, Somalis achieved it when the
former British protectorate of Somaliland and Italy’s newly-freed
Somaliland colony united to form what eventually became known as
Somalia. Corruption, dictatorship and factional fighting eroded Somali
solidarity, however. Against the backdrop of civil war and genocide
against the Isaaq clan, Somaliland unilaterally declared its
independence in 1991, a move many Somalis rejected but were powerless to
anything about. In the three decades since, Somaliland has effectively
acted as a separate country, with its own elected president, parliament,
flag and currency.
President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, popularly known as Farmajo, has
used Somaliland’s separatism to rally Somali nationalism. Whereas
Somalia and Somaliland lived largely peacefully and in parallel during
the first quarter-century since Somaliland’s renewed independence claim,
Farmajo has been aggressive toward Africa’s would-be 55th recognized
state. He has supported Puntland’s territorial claims and military
actions in Sool and Sanaag. He has weaponized sovereignty, targeting
overflights with an eye toward ending international air travel into
Hargeisa, and not only refused to distribute Somaliland international
aid in line with its proportion of the population, but has also sought
to force international NGOs to work only through Mogadishu. In this,
U.S. Ambassador Donald Yamamoto has also been complicit, using his
position as head of the U.S. country mission to dissuade the National
Endowment for Democracy and its component grantees from working in
Somaliland and thereby pulling the carpet out from greater Somalia’s
only democratic region at a time Farmajo doubles down on dictatorship.
If the goal is Somali unity, even Farmajo’s supporters must recognize
his approach has backfired. In order to convince Somalilanders to
return to the greater Somalia fold, Farmajo must make them want to
return. Farmajo’s tenure, however, has repelled Somalilanders rather
than force them to reconsider their positions.
Consider security: Somaliland has it; Somalia does not. Saccharine assurances by
Somalia’s new ambassador to Washington aside, the reality is the
al-Shabaab has staged a resurgence under Farmajo’s rule. In Baghdad,
Iraqi President Barham Salih has walked the streets and visited the markets;
Farmajo is afraid to do likewise, his statements to the international
community about Mogadishu’s improving security situation
notwithstanding. Just this month, for example, al-Shabaab detonated a car bomb near Somalia’s parliament. Just weeks before, another car bomb killed at
least 90 on the outskirts of town. In contrast, the last major attack
in Hargeisa was more than a decade ago. How Somaliland maintains
security without billions of dollars in foreign assistance, but Somalia
cannot is a question that Farmajo should address.
Or consider business: Somali officials say Somalia could rebound if
only the world forgives $5 billion in debt, much of which its political
class stole. Somaliland lives within its means, and is already a
business hub. Coca Cola, for example, established its second largest
bottling plant in Africa in Somaliland. Dubai World’s operations in
Berbera are taking off. Companies across the world are circling
Somaliland’s mining sector. While Somalia also hopes to attract foreign
investment, its inferior security situation heightens both risks and
costs for potential investors.
Or consider democracy: In theory, Somalia aims for one-man, one-vote
elections but it is uncertain if it can achieve them on schedule. In
regional elections, Farmajo only embraces democracy when it delivers
candidates allied with him, and uses the state treasury and air space
restrictions to undermine political opponents. In Somaliland, by
contrast, voters undergo biometric iris scan registration, and their
votes matter: Somaliland has had five elected presidents, and incumbents
have stepped down with little complaint. There is no excuse for
persistent delays to a new one-man, one-vote parliamentary election, but
even that failure still puts it ahead of Somalia.
Then there’s rule-of-law: When Somalis or Somalilanders buy a house
or invest in a business, they put all their money down at once; there
are no 15- or 30-year mortgages like in the West. This makes purchasing
properties or starting businesses tremendously risky endeavors, one
which requires tremendous confidence that the system will treat them
fairly. Here, too, there is stark disparity between Somalia and
Somaliland. In Somalia, Farmajo has done little to reduce Somalia’s
corruption problem. Transparency International, for example, has now
ranked Somalia as the world’s most corrupt country for more than 15
years. Ordinary Somalis regularly go to al-Shabaab courts because they
believe they are both fairer and quicker than state-run courts.
Corruption also exists in Somaliland, but at a much-reduced level. And
while Somalilanders rightly complaint about a lack of modern banking and
the tendency of monopolistic businesses to charge uncompetitive rates
for loans, they also feel that if they buy a house or a business,
neither militias nor political cronies will confiscate their property or
the fruits of their labor.
Somalia’s dream of unity is understandable and it can be compelling,
just as those supporting Somaliland separatism can find their case
persuasive. But, what Farmajo forgets or does not understand is that if
Somalia is going to reunite with Somaliland, it must perform better than
Somaliland. It must be more stable, more secure, more democratic, and
less corrupt. It must have a better economy that will be a regional
envy. Somalia cannot force Somaliland into its fold militarily; it is
not strong enough and occupying Somaliland will never bring peace.
Militaristic rhetoric from Farmajo will only exacerbate mistrust born
from his relative Siad Barre’s rule and the human rights abuses he
perpetrated in Somaliland. What neither Farmajo nor Yamamoto understand
is that economic strangulation also will not compel Somaliland to rejoin
Somalia. Indeed, it is hard to imagine Hargeisa under Mogadishu’s
control when even Mogadishu is not under Mogadishu’s control.
Somali nationalists can cast aspersions toward Somaliland
nationalists, and they can troll on social media. Farmajo’s advisors and
his press spokesmen can insult from an official podium before they
retreat into armored cars and locked-down compounds, or take official
planes to Doha and Istanbul. But none of their tactics will achieve
their goals; indeed, they only make them harder to attain. If Somali
nationalists want to restore Somali greatness, there is no substitute
for reform. Simply put, for there to be unity, Somalia must be better
than Somaliland rather than try to suffocate Somaliland.
Micheal Rubin
aei.org
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