- Somaliland is a success story in a
part of the world where those are rare. For 27 years, the self-declared
state—with little outside assistance—has defied the odds. In contrast
with Somalia, from which it declared its independence in 1991,
Somaliland has enjoyed years of relative stability and democratic
governance.
The autonomous but unrecognized
Republic of Somaliland has also eradicated piracy from its shores and
thwarted the jihadist group al-Shabaab’s expansion within its borders.
Somalia hasn’t managed any of this, despite the billions of dollars
expended by the international community over nearly two decades.
Rather than spending money it has
never had on advanced weaponry, drones, and a large unwieldy army,
Somaliland has instead focused on the two things that always form the
backbone of successful counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency: good
governance and reliable human intelligence. The two are almost always
linked.
Good governance guarantees buy-in and
cooperation from communities whose members are on the frontlines of the
war against extremists. The government of Somaliland recognized this
early on when it developed its anti-piracy program.
Those anti-piracy efforts denied
maritime gangs access to its shores and coastal waters at a time when
pirates based in Somalia and Puntland, a semiautonomous region directly
south of Somaliland, were attempting to hijack vessels on an almost
daily basis (40 were successfully stolen in 2008). In Somalia and
Puntland, pirate gangs had free rein in many areas and became mainstays
of the local economies.
The overall cost of Somaliland’s
anti-piracy program was less than $500,000 in 2010, when, during the
same period, the U.S. and its international partners were sinking
hundreds of millions off the coast of Somalia. These international
efforts did reduce incidents of piracy but they did little to combat the
problem on the ground in Somalia and Puntland, where many pirate gangs
simply shifted from hijacking to kidnapping. Some pirates went on to
join al-Shabaab.
In contrast, Somaliland’s program
dealt directly with the problem by preventing pirates from establishing
ties to local communities. The government of Somaliland ensured that
coastal areas played a leading role, becoming its eyes and ears. At the
cost of a few cell phones, Somaliland established a highly effective
early warning system that allowed communities to report suspicious
activity and provide the very local and immediate intelligence that is
critical to fighting piracy.
Somaliland’s government learned a
great deal from its anti-piracy efforts and applied those lessons to its
equally successful counter-terror operations. Just as with the fight
against pirates, community engagement remains central to the battle
against al-Shabaab. Somaliland does not rely on drones, military
contractors, or any of the other expensive trappings of the
counter-terror programs of its southern neighbors. Instead, the key
element of its operations are the people it defends. The best
intelligence, which is critical to fighting a group like al-Shabaab, is
not produced as a result of coercion or payments. Instead, Somaliland
pays for the information provided by its citizens by maintaining a
government they can participate in and rely on—at least much of the
time—to respond to threats to their communities.
By comparison, al-Shabaab remains a
potent force in Somalia despite the billions of dollars spent trying to
eradicate it. The U.S. government alone spends tens of millions annually
on its counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia, where it relies on drones,
Special Forces raids, dubious and poorly led militias, and military
contractors to battle al-Shabaab.
In addition to American efforts and
expenditures, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has deployed
thousands of soldiers supplied with heavy weaponry and air support to
combat al-Shabaab. Yet despite their overwhelming numerical and
technological superiority, al-Shabaab persists and remains a highly
capable foe.
The reason for this is that the
leadership of al-Shabaab understands what all successful insurgent
groups understand: predictability, reliable governance, and community
engagement are critical to maintaining support. The governance that
al-Shabaab provides is brutal but at the same time it is predictable and
rarely arbitrary. The government of Somalia is slowly building its
capacity to govern but still fails to provide its citizens—especially
those living in areas away from urban centers—with the level of
consistent security that al-Shabaab does.
This is evidenced by the fact that
many Somalis actually seek out courts run by al-Shabaab rather than
those operated by the Somali government. This is because al-Shabaab’s
courts issue verdicts quickly, offer arbitration that is often in line
with local customs, and are more capable of enforcing verdicts and
arbitration. Even in the Somali capital of Mogadishu, al-Shabaab-linked
clerics and qadis run a parallel justice system that is favored by some
residents.
Al-Shabaab understands exactly what
the government of Somaliland understands: that consistent governance is
fundamental to maintaining the support of communities. The support it’s
gained as a result is exactly what an insurgent group needs to persist
and even defeat a better-armed adversary.
But in Somaliland’s case, that
support has fallen behind the democratic government, which has allowed
the authorities to consistently thwart and defeat terrorists. This is
the only weapon that will work in the war on terror over the long term: good governance in which citizens can participate and take pride.
Michael Horton
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Michael Horton is a foreign policy analyst who has written for numerous publications, including Intelligence Review, West Point CTC Sentinel, The Economist, The National Interest, and The Christian Science Monitor
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